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Abstract 
It is important in any democratic society that law-makers consider the general views of the 
public and act in accordance with these. It is widely accepted that by doing so, laws will be 
made which benefit the majority of New Zealanders. However, the judicial branch of 
government is not commonly seen as a law-making body. As such, they usually fail to defer to 
public opinion, because their decisions do not have the effect of making new law. Judges 
merely apply the current law. It is often argued that the judiciary should have more power to 
create law, as they can protect minority rights and provide a more effective check on the 
supreme power of Parliament. This paper looks at various situations where judges could have 
more authority to make law. Emphasis is placed on controversial human rights issues. 
However, if we accept judges could have more law-making power, this raises a fundamental 
issue: What role should public opinion play in a reformed system? This paper focuses on the 
main arguments for and against judicial consideration of public opinion when judges are 
essentially making new law. It is ultimately concluded that judicial law-makers should consider 
public opinion as one of many relevant factors only in cases where the outcome has a law-
making consequence that will affect a substantial portion of society. This restrictive outcome 
preserves the traditional role of the judiciary as a protector of human rights. 
Key Words 
Democracy; Judiciary; Judicial Law-Making; Public Opinion 
I Introduction 
The concept of democracy was first developed in Ancient Greece,1 and it later spread around 
the world. Kostas Vlassopoulos wrote that after the end of the Second World War, democracy 
had become “the only possible political system in an egalitarian society”.2 Democracy is seen 
as an important foundation of any legal system, as power is vested in the ordinary people of a 
country. Therefore, popular public opinion is fundamental to effective law-making. In New 
Zealand, we have a legal system based on representative democracy, which means that citizens 
freely elect officials who create written laws.3 In order to be re-elected, our representatives 
generally try to enact laws which reflect the wishes of the majority.4 This means public opinion 
                                                          
1 John Thorley Athenian Democracy (Routledge, New York, 2005) at 2-3. 
2 Kostas Vlassopoulos Antiquity and its Legacy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 33. 
3 Constitution Act 1986, s 15. 
4 HLA Hart Law, Liberty, and Morality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968) at 47. 
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plays a major role in law-making, particularly when controversial human rights issues are 
raised. 
While there are fundamental benefits of having a democratic system, there are also some 
problems with the heavy reliance placed on majoritarian public opinion. In particular, it can be 
difficult for Parliament to legislate in certain areas, because it can be hard to gain broad support 
for particular laws. This problem is especially cogent when Parliament makes decisions about 
minority rights.5 Law-makers want to reflect the wishes of the majority, which means majority 
groups can effectively decide what rights are afforded to various minority groups. John Stuart 
Mill argued that this is a problem inherent in any democratic system, saying that minority 
groups are often subjected to the tyranny of the majority.6 There are many examples of this 
issue arising in the New Zealand context. From the fight for women’s suffrage in the nineteenth 
century to modern-day Treaty settlements, public opinion has long been the deciding factor in 
controversial human rights adjudication.7 This problem arose more recently, when Parliament 
decided to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples.8 This change only occurred after 
public opinion shifted in favour of reform.9 These examples show the main problem with a 
system of pure legislative supremacy: there is no effective alternative way to secure passage of 
positive human rights legislation without relying on support from the public. 
While Parliament creates laws in New Zealand, the role of the judiciary is to apply these laws 
to individual cases.10 Therefore, the judiciary does not usually take public opinion into 
account.11 In this paper, consideration is given to the various ways the role of the judiciary 
could be altered to give the courts more power to make substantive decisions about 
controversial issues. Following this, focus shifts to whether it would be democratically 
legitimate for the courts to continue to ignore public opinion if they started adjudicating on 
policy issues. If we assume that judges should have more law-making power, then it may not 
be democratically legitimate for them to continue to act without deference to public opinion. It 
is ultimately concluded that if the judiciary had broader powers, they should consider public 
opinion when making decisions that have a wide societal impact. Public opinion should be one 
                                                          
5 HLA Hart, above n 4, at 1-5. 
6 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Longman, Roberts, and Green, London, 1869) at 7. 
7 “A Brief History of Women’s Suffrage in New Zealand” (20 December 2012) Ministry for Culture and 
Heritage <www.nzhistory.net.nz>. 
8 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, s 4. 
9 (29 August 2012) 683 NZPD 4913. 
10 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 288-
289. 
11 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct” (March 2013) Courts of New Zealand <courtsofnz.govt.nz> at [9]-[11]. 
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of many relevant factors for judicial consideration. However, when adjudicating for private 
matters or matters that affect only a portion of the population, the courts should continue to 
ignore public opinion. This narrow outcome is beneficial because it preserves the fundamental 
role of the judiciary as a protector of human rights and a safeguard against the unrestrained 
power of the legislature. 
Part II takes an in-depth look at our current constitutional arrangements and considers options 
for reform. The concept of legislative supremacy is described and critiqued. One specific 
problem with the current system is that majoritarian public opinion usually prevails. This can 
lead to the passage of legislation which undermines human rights or erodes the function of the 
judiciary. Consideration then shifts to the possible options for judicial intervention to uphold 
human rights. Instead of the present approach, the New Zealand legal system could use more 
aggressive forms of judicial review to protect minority rights. This judicial intervention could 
come in a number of forms. These options are merely described and critiqued for background 
information; no final recommendation is made. I discuss four different hypothetical options, 
which are addressed in order from “weakest” to “strongest”. First, the courts could make a 
declaration of inconsistency. Second, the courts can take a more liberal approach to judicial 
interpretation. Third, the courts could refuse to apply any legislation that purported to supersede 
fundamental rights.12 Fourth, New Zealand could adopt a system of complete judicial 
supremacy.13 Any of these options could reduce the problem of majoritarian control and protect 
human rights. 
Part III focuses on the implications of increased judicial law-making. In particular, it is 
arguable that judicial law-makers should consider public opinion (especially when adjudicating 
in controversial human rights cases). This is because without reference to public opinion, 
judges may act without regard to what the ordinary people of New Zealand want. This would 
erode the democratic nature of the New Zealand legal system.14 Just as Parliament must 
consider public opinion, it would make sense for the judiciary to consider this as well.15 It is 
arguable that if the judiciary takes on a law-making function, then they should also be expected 
to listen to the people. However, if the judiciary does start to consider public opinion, they 
could lose some of their independence and the same issues with majoritarian control of the 
legislature could begin to arise. There are three key arguments in favour of judges continuing 
                                                          
12 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398. 
13 See Constitution of the United States of America, art 6(2). 
14 Michael Sandel “Why Democracy?” (Podcast, 14 March 2015) BBC <bbc.co.uk>. 
15 Michael Sandel, above n 14. 
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to act without reference to public opinion: (a) the judiciary can continue to protect minority 
rights in the face of adverse public opinion, (b) refusal to consider public opinion ensures the 
judiciary remains apolitical so judicial independence is upheld, and (c) public opinion has no 
legal weight and judges may have difficulty ascertaining public opinion. These propositions 
are discussed in turn and presented along with important counter-arguments. 
Part IV makes an ultimate recommendation about what the judicial position should be if one 
of the four hypothetical options were implemented. If the judiciary has increased law-making 
powers, then they should consider public opinion in certain cases. Consideration of public 
opinion should be confined to cases where judges are (1) effectively creating a new law and 
(2) this new law will affect a substantial part of society. In addition, public opinion should only 
be one relevant factor. It should not be conclusive nor should it be determinative. This position 
allows the judiciary to continue to fairly and impartially adjudicate on contentious issues, but 
goes some way towards remedying the democratic deficit inherent in judicial law-making. 
II Possibility of Increased Judicial Law-Making 
This part first outlines the constitutional position in New Zealand and discusses the main 
problem with its practical application: laws that reflect popular public opinion usually prevail 
and these laws can be inconsistent with human rights. New Zealand has a system of pure 
legislative supremacy, which means Parliament has “full power to make laws”.16 AV Dicey 
wrote that under such a system, Parliament has the ultimate power to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever. No other entity has the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.17 
In addition, New Zealand has a unicameral legislature. There is only one law-making body: the 
House of Representatives. Geoffrey Palmer argues that this makes the Parliament of New 
Zealand especially powerful.18 On the other hand, the task of the judiciary is merely to apply 
the law to individual cases.19 Therefore, the judiciary cannot refuse to apply any law made by 
Parliament, even if it directly and unjustifiably contravenes the Bill of Rights Act 1990.20 This 
part focuses on two main issues: (1) Parliament can legislate in opposition to human rights and 
(2) Parliament can legislate the powers of the judiciary away. To remedy these issues, it is 
                                                          
16 Constitution Act, s 15. 
17 AV Dicey “The Nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty” in An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (Liberty Classics, 1982 [1885]) at 3-4. 
18 Geoffrey Palmer “The Bill of Rights after Twenty-One Years: the New Zealand Constitutional Caravan 
Moves on?” (2013) 11 NZJPIL 257 at 263. 
19 Andrew Stockley “An Independent Judiciary” in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government and Politics 
(5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 114. 
20 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
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ultimately argued that some consideration should be given to four alternatives to our system of 
pure legislative supremacy. 
The theoretically unlimited power given to Parliament has led to some major human rights 
violations in recent years. Parliament has focused on appeasing majority groups at the expense 
of minority rights. This is perhaps best shown by the number of Acts that have been passed 
which unjustifiably conflict with the rights in the Bill of Rights Act. When a bill is first 
introduced to Parliament, the Attorney-General is required to issue a section 7 report if the bill 
unjustifiably violates any rights.21 From 1990 to 2014, the Attorney-General issued a section 7 
report for 62 different bills. Of these, 36 bills went on to be enacted as law (and four bills are 
still before Parliament).22 Paul Rishworth argues that the enactment of even a single bill which 
had a section 7 report would be objectionable.23 The enactment of 36 pieces of legislation which 
unjustifiably conflict with human rights is alarming and shows that Parliament has a general 
indifference towards positive human rights adjudication. Paul Rishworth also noted that in 
many areas it is seen as “acceptable [for Parliament] to override the Bill of Rights”.24 Andrew 
Geddis concludes that Parliament largely ignores section 7 reports once a bill has entered the 
House.25 
The insignificance that Parliament regularly ascribes to human rights is a serious issue. This 
problem is exacerbated given the broad power that Parliament enjoys. In order to appease the 
public, the legislature can override any judicial decision made in favour of human rights and 
can even remove the right of appeal to an independent tribunal.26 Under the current 
constitutional arrangements, Parliament has immense power to override decisions made by the 
judiciary. It is arguable that power should be shared more evenly between these two branches 
of government. Two fairly recent cases show this problem in practice. 
First, there is an example of Parliament legislating to reverse the effect of a judicial decision. 
In Attorney-General v Ngati Apa, the High Court decided that the Maori Land Court had 
jurisdiction to conduct an investigation into native title in the foreshore and seabed.27 The 
                                                          
21 Bill of Rights Act, s 7. 
22 Christopher Finlayson, Attorney-General “Section 7 of the Bill of Rights: an Attorney-General’s perspective” 
(Remarks to New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law, Policy and Practice, University of Auckland, 
Auckland, 2014) at 2. 
23 Paul Rishworth “Human Rights” [2005] NZ L Rev 87 at 103. 
24 At 104. 
25 Andrew Geddis “Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation: How New Zealand’s Parliament Failed” [2011] 
NZ L Rev 443 at 444. 
26 AV Dicey, above n 17, at 4. 
27 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 at 643-645. 
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decision was met with public outcry.28 In response, Parliament soon passed the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004, which reversed the decision and guaranteed that the foreshore and seabed 
were publicly owned.29 The outcome of the court case did not reflect public opinion and as a 
consequence, legislation changed the outcome. This case shows that even if courts do make 
changes to protect minority rights, Parliament, who is presumably reflecting public opinion, 
can simply change the outcome. Therefore, on a practical level, courts have very little power 
to make meaningful decisions that promote human rights. 
Second, there is an example of Parliament removing the right of appeal to an independent 
tribunal (namely the Human Rights Commission). The enactment of section 70E(2) of the New 
Zealand Public Health and Disability Amendment Act 2013 means that no one can bring a 
claim for judicial review relating to a decision made under the Act. By disallowing appeals, 
Parliament can reduce the amount of public money spent on paying private caregivers. This 
would appease the majority of the public, as many taxpayers do not want to see government 
money spent paying caregiving costs.30 Andrew Geddis took particular issue with this part of 
the Act, saying that “the judiciary's primary function - to declare the meaning of law and its 
application in particular cases - has been nullified”.31 He continued by adding that “the 
judiciary's role as protector of individual citizens in terms of ensuring that they are being treated 
in accordance with the laws of the land has been removed”.32 The Attorney-General had issued 
a section 7 report prior to the enactment of the bill, saying it breached section 27(2) of the Bill 
of Rights Act.33 This report was once again ignored by Parliament.34 
These examples show that when Parliament enacts legislation that conforms to popular public 
opinion, this can often result in flagrant rights violations and confiscations of judicial power. 
Given the problems inherent in a system of pure legislative supremacy, there is an argument to 
be made that the judiciary should have broader power to make and/or unmake law. With 
enhanced power, the judicial branch of government could offer a more effective check on the 
power of the legislature. Dean Knight notes that “if the present trend continues and Parliament 
                                                          
28 (6 May 2004) 617 NZPD 12718). 
29 Section 13. 
30 (16 May 2013) 690 NZPD 10116. 
31 Andrew Geddis “I think National just broke our constitution” (17 May 2013) Pundit <www.pundit.co.nz>. 
32 Andrew Geddis “I think National just broke our constitution”, above n 31. 
33 Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Amendment Bill (No 2) (16 May 2013).  
34 Note that section 27 covers the right to justice. Section 27(2) reads “Every person whose rights, obligations, 
or interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public 
authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that determination”. 
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continues to treat rights with summary disdain … [the] courts will feel obliged to exercise 
greater vigilance about rights”.35 As noted, Parliament has increasingly shown disregard for 
important human rights. Therefore, it may be time for the courts to intervene. The justification 
for this is based on two important elements of the judiciary: judicial independence and judicial 
expertise. Both of these factors support the proposition that the judiciary should have more 
power. 
The first main argument for increasing judicial authority is the concept of judicial 
independence. Judges are sworn to be impartial and must be totally free from outside 
pressures.36 Therefore, they make decisions in a very logical way and are not constrained by 
popular public opinion. This is in stark contrast to the ad hoc and emotive style of law-making 
which Parliament has adopted. Geoffrey Palmer writes that “the courts enjoy a high reputation 
for fairness and impartiality” and the judiciary is “likely to be the most reliable [branch of 
government] in [terms of] its adherence to principle, neutrality, and rationality”.37 In addition, 
courts generally consider important factors that Parliament may overlook, such as the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi, international human rights obligations, the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights Act, and the principles of proportionality and consistency in judicial decision-
making.38 Courts can make decisions with positive implications for human rights and are not 
traditionally constrained by political affiliation and public opinion. 
Judges can also make better decisions than those of Parliamentarians based on their expert legal 
knowledge. The minimum standard for judicial appointment is that candidates have at least 
seven years’ prior experience as a lawyer.39 In addition, Courts of New Zealand states that:40 
[Judges] must be of good character, have a sound knowledge of the law and of its practice, and 
have a real sense of what justice means and requires in present-day New Zealand. They must 
have the discipline, capacity and insight to act impartially, independently and fairly. 
                                                          
35 Dean Knight “Parliament and the Bill of Rights — a blasé attitude?” (6 April 2009) LAWS179 Elephants and 
the Law <www.laws179.co.nz>. 
36 Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s 18. 
37 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, above n 10, at 285. 
38 Phillip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brooker’s Ltd, Wellington, 
2001) at 778. 
39 Judicature Act 1908, s 6. 
40 “Judicial Appointments” Courts of New Zealand <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
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None of these requirements are essential for legislators, because they are democratically 
elected.41 Because of this, members of the judiciary have expert legal knowledge that many 
members of the legislature do not possess. 
In addition, courts respond to practical, realistic situations in a way that the legislature does 
not.42 Stephen Gardbaum noted that courts “indeed  bring  a  more  context  specific  or  
‘applied’  dimension  to  rights deliberation  that  complements  the  necessarily  greater  
generality  of that  undertaken  by legislatures”.43 Courts can respond to potential law changes 
in a practical way, as opposed to the largely theoretical approach taken by the legislature. It is 
arguable that the legal system could make more use of the courts, as judges have the skills to 
contribute to the development of the law in a more substantive way. 
A Options for Increased Judicial Law-Making 
Based on this discussion, it is arguable that courts should intervene when Parliament fails to 
act. Currently, courts have no power to make law. Their function is to interpret the law as 
written by Parliament.44 Instead of the present approach, the New Zealand legal system could 
use more aggressive forms of judicial review to protect minority rights. This judicial 
intervention could come in a number of forms. This subpart discusses four different 
hypothetical options, which are addressed in order from “weakest” to “strongest”. First, there 
could be “weaker-form judicial review” as discussed by Stephen Gardbaum, where courts can 
issue a non-binding declaration of inconsistency.45 Second, courts can take a more liberal 
approach to judicial interpretation. Third, courts could acknowledge an idea developed by Lord 
Cooke, who said that some rights are so fundamental that they cannot be overridden by 
legislation and the courts would not have to apply any legislation that purported to supersede 
these rights.46 Fourth, New Zealand could adopt a system of complete judicial supremacy, 
where courts can declare any law to be unjustifiably inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act 
and have it overturned.47 Any of these options have the potential to reduce the problem of 
majoritarian control and protect human rights. These options are now described and evaluated 
                                                          
41 Constitution Act, s 17. 
42 Richard Fallon Jr. “The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review” (2008) 121 Harv L Rev 1693 at 1709. 
43 Steven Gardbaum “The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism” (2013) 14 German LJ 
2230 at 2236. 
44 ATH Smith (ed) Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (12th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2002) at 23-
24. 
45 Steven Gardbaum, above n 43, at 2241-2248. 
46 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board, above n 12, at 398. 
47 See Constitution of the United States of America, art 6(2). 
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in turn. The various approaches are canvassed simply as different options for judicial 
intervention and I make no conclusion as to which one (if any) is most appropriate. 
1 Declaration of inconsistency 
The first option for judicial intervention is the “weakest” and it is not incompatible with 
Parliamentary sovereignty. A declaration of inconsistency occurs when the court issues a 
formal statement that legislation is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act.48 New Zealand 
courts have long considered the possibility of making a declaration of this type.49 In 1998, Paul 
Rishworth wrote “[Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act] precludes judges from doing numerous 
things in response to inconsistency [such as refusing to apply the legislation]”. However, he 
goes on to add that “one thing it does not do is preclude comment and proclamation”.50 The 
courts refused to issue such a declaration until earlier this year, when the High Court made the 
first judicial declaration of inconsistency in Taylor v Attorney-General.51 Geoffrey Palmer and 
Matthew Palmer argued that such a declaration would have an impressive political effect as it 
would inform the public of human rights violations and essentially force the hand of any 
legislators.52 The theory was that a judicial message would encourage voluntary legislative 
change. 
A declaration of inconsistency is comparable to the section 7 reports issued by the Attorney-
General. They have no legal weight, but they do provide a public indication that legislation is 
inconsistent with human rights. Geoffrey Palmer notes one important advantage that a 
declaration of inconsistency has: it offers commentary on the final version of the legislation.53 
This is advantageous as offensive provisions can be added during the legislative process.54 
Therefore, a declaration of inconsistency can be conceptualised as a more reliable version of a 
section 7 report. It has no legal weight, but can be a useful way for the judiciary to provide 
commentary on the actions of Parliament and promote political change. 
 
                                                          
48 Steven Gardbaum, above n 43, at 2245-2248. 
49 See for example the discussion in Taylor v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 1630 at [83]. 
50 Paul Rishworth “Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-General” [1998] New 
Zealand Law Review 683 at 693. 
51 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706. 
52 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, above n 10, at 289. 
53 Geoffrey Palmer “The Bill of Rights after Twenty-One Years: the New Zealand Constitutional Caravan 
Moves on?”, above n 18, at 261. 
54 Claudia Geiringer “Declarations of inconsistency dodged again” (2009) NZLJ 232 at 233. 
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2 Liberal approach to judicial interpretation 
The next option for judicial intervention is for courts to adopt a more liberal approach to 
interpreting legislation that is potentially ambiguous. Unlike a declaration of inconsistency, 
this option does have some legal weight. Traditionally, the role of the judiciary is to apply the 
ordinary meaning of the statute as it was written by Parliament.55 If the wording of a statute is 
unambiguous, then the courts must apply this, regardless of any potential rights violations.56 
However, many of the words in a statute can be uncertain (or can be construed as being 
uncertain). When this occurs, it is the task of the judiciary to resolve any ambiguities.57 When 
the judiciary does this “a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained [in 
the Bill of Rights] … shall be preferred to any other meaning”.58 Historically, the courts have 
taken a very cautious and prudent approach to interpreting legislation. Geoffrey Palmer writes 
that so far judges have been “careful and modest as to their role”.59 However, the courts do 
have substantial power in interpreting legislation. In another text, Geoffrey Palmer argued that 
“a statute [simply] means what the courts say it means”.60 Courts have the power to come up 
with creative interpretations when faced with potentially ambiguous legislative terms.61 
Shimon Shetreet argues that in recent years, across jurisdictions, there has been an increasing 
demand on the judiciary to resolve political issues through liberal interpretation. Litigants have 
tried to avoid the arduous legal process by opting to bring a case to court for resolution.62 
Utilising the court process can promote efficiency of outcomes. Sir Owen Woodhouse noted 
that this trend has started to occur in the New Zealand context.63 Minority groups are gradually 
starting to petition the courts to take action, because public opinion is constraining the actions 
of the legislature. 
A prime example of this approach is the recent case of Seales v Attorney-General. The case 
concerned a terminally ill cancer patient, Lecretia Seales, who petitioned the court for her right 
                                                          
55 Andrew Stockley, above n 19, at 114. 
56 Bill of Rights Act, s 4. 
57 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5. 
58 Bill of Right Act, s 6. 
59 Geoffrey Palmer “The Bill of Rights after Twenty-One Years: the New Zealand Constitutional Caravan 
Moves on?”, above n 18, at 259. 
60 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, above n 10, at 289. 
61 See for example the discussion in R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 and R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37. 
62 Shimon Shetreet “Judicial independence and accountability: core values in liberal democracies” in HP Lee 
(ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) at 13. 
63 Sir Owen Woodhouse “Government under the Law” (The Sixth J.C. Beaglehole Memorial Lecture, Price 
Milburn for the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, Wellington, 1979) at 7. 
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to die (although Parliament had not expressly passed euthanasia laws).64 Ms Seales based her 
argument on two sections of the Crimes Act 1961: section 160(2)(a) (which prohibits the killing 
of any person by an unlawful act) and section 179(b) (which prohibits aiding or abetting the 
commission of suicide).65 Ms Seales argued that if her doctor administered a fatal drug, the 
doctor would be “[administering] aid in dying” or “[facilitating] aid in dying”.66 These actions 
were submitted to be outside the scope of the two sections of the Crimes Act. The plaintiff 
based this argument on section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, which holds that when two 
interpretations of an Act are available to the courts, the one most consistent with the Bill of 
Rights Act is to be preferred.67 Prior to the hearing of the case, Andrew Geddis and Kathryn 
Tucker wrote that this was an exercise in statutory interpretation and accordingly, the plaintiff 
had a high chance of success.68 However, the court rejected the plaintiff’s case, saying that any 
change had to be left for Parliament to make.69 Although the judiciary chose not to intervene 
and engage in a law-making function, this case shows there is an increasing demand on the 
judiciary to act when Parliament is unable or unwilling. 
3 Refusal to apply some legislation 
The previous two examples covered situations where the judiciary is still applying the law as 
written by Parliament. Consideration is now given to two situations where courts could refuse 
to apply legislation as written by Parliament. First, under the current system, the courts could 
refuse to apply legislation that eroded fundamental rights. Second, under a reformed system, 
the courts could refuse to apply legislation that unjustifiably conflicted with the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
First, the courts could read in some form of restriction on Parliament’s ability to enact law. 
There could be some laws, such as the abolition of the judiciary, which Parliament does not 
actually have the inherent power to pass. Lord Cooke of Thorndon wrote about this idea, 
saying: 70 
                                                          
64 Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239. 
65 At [7]. 
66 At [5]-[6]. 
67 At [209]. 
68 Andrew Geddis and Kathryn Tucker “Litigating for a More Peaceful Death” [2015] NZLJ 172 at 174-176. 
69 Seales v Attorney-General, above n 64, at [211]. 
70 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board, above n 12, at 398. 
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I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture for instance, would be within the [lawful] 
powers of Parliament. Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament 
could not override them. 
This is perhaps the most famous pronouncement that some theoretical limits on Parliamentary 
sovereignty exist. However, this issue has also arisen in several other cases. A number of judges 
have argued that if extreme legislation is passed, the courts reserve the power to refuse to apply 
it.71 This mechanism could be a useful way for the courts to protect fundamental rights, as they 
could simply refuse to apply legislation that purports to override the most fundamental of 
common law rights. There are no practical examples of this power being used in practice, and 
it is arguable whether it currently exists in New Zealand. 
4 Judicial supremacy 
Finally, New Zealand could adopt the “strongest” form of judicial review. Under a reformed 
system of complete judicial supremacy, courts could legally strike down legislation which is 
inconsistent with fundamental human rights, as is the case in the United States.72 Under such a 
system, the courts would have the power to invalidate any legislation that was incapable of 
being read consistently with the rights contained in the Bill of Rights Act. This would ensure 
that human rights can be protected by the judiciary, even in the face of adverse public opinion. 
The courts can look at a provision impartially and determine whether it is consistent with rights 
legislation.73 They are not constrained by political pressures or the desire to be re-elected every 
three years.74 The judiciary would have the authority to provide an effective check on 
legislative power. 
An example of this is the recent case of Obergefell v Hodges, where the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that access to same-sex marriage is a right protected by the equal protection clause 
in the United States Constitution.75 The legislature had failed to take action over this issue. 
However, because state legislation providing that “marriage” was defined as the union of one 
man and one woman was incapable of being read consistently with the rights contained in the 
Constitution, the court could declare the legislation invalid.76 Therefore, access to marriage is 
                                                          
71 See for example L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519 at 527; Brader v Ministry of Transport [1981] 1 NZLR 73 at 78; 
New Zealand Drivers Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374 at 390; Fraser v State 
Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116 at 121. 
72 Constitution of the United States of America, art 6(2). 
73 Lord Cooke of Thorndon “The Myth of Sovereignty” (2005) 3 NZJPIL 39 at 41. 
74 Constitution Act, s 23. 
75 Obergefell v Hodges 576 US ___ (2015); See also Constitution of the United States of America, art 14. 
76 At 1-2. 
15 
 
now guaranteed across the United States for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. This 
example shows how the “strongest” form of judicial review can be used to protect minority 
rights. 
III Should Judicial Law-Makers Consider Public Opinion? 
Despite the benefits of judicial law-making, there is a fundamental problem with all four of 
these approaches. This problem is particularly apparent for the “stronger” forms of judicial 
review. The main criticism of expanded judicial law-making power is based on the fact that the 
judiciary is unelected and does not represent the diversity of New Zealand society. Therefore, 
it would be inconsistent with the principles of democracy to give the courts power to interfere 
with legislation made by a democratically elected legislature. The argument is that for any 
successful society to function, the will of the people must prevail.77 Any law-making function 
provided by the judiciary would suffer from a democratic deficit in the sense that majoritarian 
public opinion would play no role. Judicial law-makers would legislate in a vacuum, devoid 
from any reference to the desires of ordinary New Zealanders. 
One way to cure this democratic deficit is to encourage the courts to consider public opinion 
when making decisions. This would mean that even if the courts had more power to make law 
(based on any of the four hypothetical options) this power would still be consistent with 
democratic values because the will of the people would be reflected in judicial outcomes. Focus 
now shifts to remedying the democratic deficit inherent in judicial law-making by encouraging 
courts to consider public opinion when they are exercising a law-making function. On one 
hand, it is arguable that the courts should retain the status quo and not consider public opinion 
(even if they are effectively making new laws). On the other hand, it is arguable that the courts 
should consider public opinion because they have broader law-making powers. This would be 
more consistent with democracy. I ultimately assert that the courts should only consider public 
opinion when their decision will have broad ramifications for a substantial portion of society. 
In addition, even in those cases, public opinion should only be one of many relevant factors for 
judges to consider. Judges should not be constrained by public opinion; it should be left to the 
judiciary to consider the weight given to this factor. This outcome would help judges to retain 
a significant degree of independence to adjudicate on important human rights issues,78 while 
ameliorating the issue of democratic deficit. 
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In this paper, I focus on the arguments against judicial consideration of public opinion. These 
arguments are based on the proposition that the ability of the judiciary to function properly 
would be undermined if they had to consider public opinion. There are three important reasons 
that judges should continue to act without deference to public opinion: (a) the judiciary can 
continue to protect minority rights in the face of adverse public opinion, (b) refusal to consider 
public opinion ensures the judiciary remains apolitical so judicial independence is upheld, and 
(c) public opinion has no legal weight and judges may have difficulty ascertaining public 
opinion. Each of these arguments is now analysed in turn. 
Despite these arguments, it is difficult to reconcile judicial law-making with the concept of 
democracy. There may be some circumstances where reference to public opinion is vital. This 
is particularly so when a judicial decision will have a broader societal impact. Therefore, under 
each of these headings, some important counter-arguments are addressed, such as: (a) the 
argument that judges need a democratic mandate in order to essentially make new law, (b) 
consideration of public opinion can provide a check on broader judicial power, and (c) judges 
must justify their decisions with reference to all relevant authority (and part of this authority 
could include public opinion). 
A Judges Should Focus on Upholding the Rights of Minority Groups 
The first argument is that judges should not consider public opinion because the judiciary 
should be designed to protect fundamental human rights.79 As discussed in Part II, Parliament 
legislates to protect the interests of majority groups, as they want to seek re-election. As an 
important check on this branch of government, the judiciary should aim to protect the interests 
of minority groups by applying an unbiased and impartial analysis to each case. Therefore, the 
judiciary can provide a check on the political nature of the legislature. Shimon Shetreet wrote 
that judges should not be restrained by public opinion, saying:80 
One should be aware of the dangers which lie in undue popular pressures on judges. Excessive 
popular pressure and irresponsible journalists, hungry for sensational pieces, may put judges in 
an unbearable position … when they very often have to act against popular wishes to protect 
dissenters and members of minority groups. 
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Historically, an important function of the judiciary has been the protection of minority rights. 
The United States Supreme Court noted that certain fundamental rights “may not be submitted 
to vote” and “they depend on the outcome of no elections”.81 If the judiciary had to consider 
public opinion, they would be seeking aims that are aligned with those of the legislature, and 
their ability to safeguard human rights would be undermined. 
A prime example of a court upholding human rights in the face of adverse public opinion 
occurred in the South African Constitutional Court case of S v Makwanyane and Another. In 
this case, the supreme judiciary held that the imposition of the death penalty was inconsistent 
with both the right to life and the right to human dignity (contained in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa).82 Accordingly, they refused to allow the government to carry out 
any more executions.83 The court focused on protecting the rights enshrined in the constitution, 
despite the fact that most South Africans supported the use of the death penalty. The majority 
accepted that public opinion was not in favour of their decision, but still said:84 
The question before us … is not what the majority of South Africans believe a proper sentence 
for murder should be. It is whether the Constitution allows the sentence. Public opinion may 
have some relevance to the enquiry, but in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the 
Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. 
The judiciary can be seen as having a very different function from the legislature. They can 
focus more heavily on the rights of minority groups because they are not constrained by a need 
to please the majority groups. 
This point can be exemplified in the New Zealand context by a case where the court was forced 
to rule against the promotion of human rights. In Quilter v Attorney-General, the court held 
that same-sex couples did not have the right to marry, because the legislation that prohibited 
this right was sufficiently unambiguous. 85 The court decided that any change had to be left to 
the supreme Parliament.86 At the time, Parliament was highly unlikely to reform the law in this 
area, because public opinion in New Zealand was largely against marriage equality.87 However, 
with increased judicial power, the court could have protected minority rights and would not 
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have to defer to popular public opinion. If the courts had one of the four options for judicial 
intervention discussed in Part II, the outcome could have been different. 
The court in Quilter v Attorney-General could have ruled in favour of minority rights, and they 
would not be bound by public opinion. First, the court could have issued a declaration that the 
Marriage Act 1955 was inconsistent with human rights, which could inform the public and 
could cause a shift in popular public opinion. This would put pressure on Parliament to change 
the law. Second, the court could have been more liberal in their interpretation of the potentially 
ambiguous statute,88 and declared that marriage is the union of any two people (based on the 
provision against discrimination in section 19 of the Bill of Rights Act). Third, under the 
current system, the court could have simply refused to apply the Marriage Act, holding that 
Parliament does not have the right to extinguish the fundamental right to marriage for same-
sex couples. Finally, under a reformed system of judicial supremacy, the judiciary could have 
overturned the Marriage Act, declaring it unjustifiably inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act. 
It is arguable that judicial law-making gives unelected judges too much power. However, it is 
clear from this example that none of the four forms of judicial intervention presented give the 
courts broad power to create any law. They can only act when legislation created by Parliament 
is unjustifiably inconsistent with human rights. Therefore, judges are not given unlimited 
power to strike down legislation. Geoffrey Palmer asserts that a system of increased judicial 
power would not be wholly incompatible with democratic values. He writes:89 
It does not seem to me to be transferring much power to the judiciary to allow them to judge 
whether Parliament's handiwork offends the basic democratic freedoms and rights articulated 
in the Bill of Rights Act. It is not giving them a carte blanche to roam all over the body politic, 
substituting judicial judgement for parliamentary judgement. It is a narrow and confined remit 
within an established body of jurisprudence that is neither frightening nor unexpected. 
Therefore, it is arguable that the courts should be able to act without reference to public opinion, 
because they are not creating law in the traditional sense. Parliament retains the power to pass 
any law. Those laws must simply be consistent with fundamental human rights. 
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When issuing the decision in Taylor v Attorney-General, Heath J asserted that his judgment 
was grounded “in the obligation of the court to declare the true legal position”.90 It is arguable 
that the judiciary and the legislature should work together in a more practical way. If the 
legislature defers to public opinion and the judiciary does not, then this should promote a more 
meaningful dialogue about what the true legal position should be. As a result, minority rights 
can be protected. 
1 Judicial law-makers need a democratic mandate 
While this outcome seems beneficial and it is arguably consistent with democracy, there is still 
one critical problem: judicial law-making lacks a democratic mandate because judges are not 
elected. The case against judicial consideration of public opinion focuses largely on the premise 
that judges only interpret the law and apply it to each individual case, so it would be 
inappropriate to take extensive external material (such as public opinion) into account. Thomas 
J described the court’s “essential function” in Electoral Commission v Tate, saying “broadly 
speaking, that function is to interpret and apply the law to the facts of a particular case”.91 When 
the courts discharge this “essential function” they are giving effect to the will of Parliament, 
and essentially, the will of the people.92 Therefore, it can be said that only under the current 
system is the existence of an unelected judiciary consistent with the concept of democracy. 
This problem is evident even if judges only have narrow power to challenge law as written by 
Parliament, because they are still substituting their will for the will of the people. The outcomes 
of cases where judges exercise their narrow law-making power can still have very wide 
ramifications. 
This is exemplified by the cases of Quilter v Attorney-General, Seales v Attorney-General, and 
Attorney-General v Ngati Apa. These three cases show that judicial decisions can potentially 
have broad implications on public policy. If the court had ruled in favour of the plaintiffs in 
Quilter v Attorney-General, this would presumably have had the effect of legalising same-sex 
marriage nationwide. Marriage equality would have become law 15 years before Parliament 
made the change, at a time when public opinion was still largely against it. If the court had 
ruled in favour of the plaintiff in Seales v Attorney-General, this could have made euthanasia 
more accessible for seriously terminally ill patients (even after Parliament had already failed 
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to make the change).93 The case of Attorney-General v Ngati Apa opened up the possibility of 
Maori groups seeking title to the foreshore and seabed,94 something which Parliament later 
rejected.95 These examples show the potentially broad implications of some important judicial 
decisions. 
Therefore, if judges have more extensive power and make decisions relating to public policy, 
then there is a strong case they should at least consider the popular public opinion on certain 
issues. Judges should consider public opinion because there should be public discussion and 
involvement in human rights adjudication. It is important that all members of the public are 
informed and are able to give their views on a particular issue. This ensures any policy decision 
is made after consulting all the people it will affect and considering all of their diverse 
perspectives.96 Just as Parliament must consider public opinion, it would make sense for the 
judiciary to consider this as well. Listening to the voices of the people is an essential part of 
democracy and it is arguable that a democratic system leads to the creation of the most effective 
laws.97 People are more likely to respect a law if they know their views were considered when 
it was made. 
Consideration of public opinion is also valuable because it promotes a utilitarian outcome. 
Utilitarianism is perhaps best described by Jeremy Bentham, who argued that “it is the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong”.98 Based on this 
approach, a good law is one that has net benefit for the general population. Citizens presumably 
vote for the outcome that gives them the most happiness, which means a democratic process 
achieves a utilitarian outcome. It is arguable that minority rights are not critically important 
provided the majority of people are satisfied with a given outcome. 
Law-makers also need to have a democratic mandate to ensure power is distributed equally. 
No group should have more authority on the basis of socio-economic status or position in 
society.99 In the interests of fairness, the views of all people should be considered when an 
entity is exercising a law-making function. Otherwise, the elite entity that holds power can 
make decisions that favour them, as opposed to decisions that are beneficial for society as a 
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whole. Throughout history, various forms of undemocratic government have been rejected in 
favour of majority rule by ordinary people. A prime example of this is the wave of revolution 
that has swept across the world over the last 300 years, as citizens have rejected bureaucratic 
systems of government.  Zhand Shakibi argues that the challenges of making and maintaining 
“the bureaucracy of a supposedly absolute monarchy function” led to the downfall of three 
monarchs: Louis XVI of France, Nicholas II of Russia, and Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran.100 
It is arguable that just like bureaucracy, a system of increased judicial power amounts to another 
form of undemocratic government. Ran Hirschl coined the term “juristocracy” which describes 
a system where power is held by elite judges.101 John Smillie criticised such a system, saying 
it is:102 
[I]nherently undemocratic to permit a small group of non-elected, mostly male, former lawyers 
to substitute their views on highly contestable moral and social issues for those of the 
democratically elected parliament. 
Judges can make decisions that benefit them and they do not represent ordinary New 
Zealanders. It is important that judges seek a democratic mandate because they are not 
generally representative of the diversity in New Zealand society. While Parliament has become 
more diverse following the introduction of a mixed member propositional representation 
electoral system,103 the judiciary is still primarily made up of Pakeha men. Catriona 
MacLennan noted that in 2013, 72 percent of judges were male.104 In addition, the judiciary is 
not sufficiently ethnically diverse. In 2015, 93.1 percent of judges identified as New Zealand 
European,105 compared to 74 percent of the general population.106 The lack of gender and ethnic 
diversity on the judiciary is concerning. 
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Judges can also lack diversity in other aspects. Ben Keith argues that judges have limited 
experience and a “limited outlook on the world”.107 Many judges are unaware of the wider 
societal impact their decisions will have. Stephen Gardbaum writes that:108 
[E]lectorally-accountable representatives are able to bring a greater diversity of views and 
perspectives to bear on rights deliberations compared to the numerically smaller, cloistered and 
elite world of the higher judiciary. 
Therefore, it is arguable that judges do not have adequate resources to make decisions that have 
a broad impact on society. Harriet Farquhar argues that a representative bench is important 
because the benefit of the different perspectives brought by diversity improve the judicial 
product.109 Therefore, if the judiciary is to effectively create law, then they should have regard 
to public opinion and the diverse views of all New Zealanders. This is an important criticism 
and it is vital that policy makers focus on a way to increase diversity within the judiciary. 
However, it is also arguable that the judiciary does not need to be substantially diverse in order 
to make the best decisions. Members of the judiciary could still have the skill and expertise to 
make important decisions about human rights. 
Finally, there is a precedent of foreign judges seeking a democratic mandate through 
consideration of public opinion. It seems as though foreign courts who have law-making power 
already generally consider the views of the public. This precedent is one that New Zealand 
should arguably follow. In particular, the outcomes of many United States Supreme Court cases 
appear to simply be reflecting majoritarian public opinion. For example, in Korematsu v United 
States the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066.110 This meant 
the federal government could order anyone of Japanese descent into an internment camp, 
regardless of citizenship. The original order was largely made in response to widespread 
xenophobia against Japanese Americans. When Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy was 
asked about the removal decision, he acknowledged that “public sentiment was a determining 
factor”.111 The Supreme Court refused to strike down the order, saying that while racial 
antagonism can never justify placing legal restrictions on an ethnic group, “pressing public 
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necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions”.112 However, with no 
evidence that Japanese Americans posed any threat to public safety,113 it seems likely that the 
Supreme Court was acting in accordance with popular public opinion. Korematsu v United 
States is an example of the United States Supreme Court ruling against minority rights in favour 
of majoritarian public opinion. One of the dissenting judges, Justice Murphy, described the 
decision as falling “into the ugly abyss of racism”.114 
Despite this, there are also examples of the United States Supreme Court choosing to promote 
human rights once popular public opinion shifts in favour of the change. In this way, the court 
has acted to speed up the legislative process, as Congress can take a long time to pass 
legislation. A recent example of this is the case of Obergefell v Hodges 576 US ___ (2015), 
where the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right nationwide.115 
Prior to this, public opinion polling had indicated broad support for the change.116 When 
discussing the ruling, Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that “… the court is 
not in a popularity contest, and it should never be influenced by today’s headlines, but 
inevitably it will be affected by the climate of the era”.117 She provided a clear statement that 
the court does not take public opinion into account. However, this is then qualified by an 
explanation that it is hard for the court to completely disregard public opinion. It seems as 
though public opinion is already an important consideration for the supreme judiciary in the 
United States, and this can sometimes come at the expense of minority rights. 
Even in New Zealand, judicial consideration of public opinion is not a new concept. Judges 
have previously asked interested groups to give evidence. A primary example of this occurred 
in a dispute about relationship property. In the case of Z v Z (No 2) the court asked interested 
groups to give evidence.118 Part of the reason for this was that the case, concerning division of 
matrimonial property, would set a precedent and have broader implications for future parties.119 
This case shows that even in a legal system based on pure legislative supremacy, there is a 
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precedent of judges seeking external aid in order to make the most appropriate decisions. In 
other jurisdictions where judicial power is broader, judges more frequently seek external 
guidance.120 This is because judges need to be very well informed before making a policy 
decision. I argue that the correct approach was taken in this case, only because the outcome of 
the case would have broader legal consequences. In addition, the opinions given by relevant 
interested groups were only one of many considerations for the court to take into account. The 
judiciary used a cautious and limited approach when considering public opinion in order to 
preserve their independence. 
B Considering Public Opinion Undermines Judicial Independence 
This leads to the second important reason for disallowing consideration of public opinion: it 
can undermine judicial independence. Judges should not consider the views of the general 
public, because judicial independence requires them to be objective and impartial.121 Members 
of the judiciary need to make decisions free from influence by other branches of government 
or the public.122 It is important that judges have both personal and substantive independence. 
Personal independence means that judges enjoy “security of office, life tenure and adequate 
remuneration and pensions”.123 These safeguards protect judges from being unduly influenced 
by any other public figures. In addition, judges require substantive independence. Shimon 
Shetreet notes substantive independence means that “in the discharge of his function a judge is 
subject to nothing but the law and the commands of his conscience”. He continues by adding 
that the judge must be “totally free from irrelevant pressures”.124 
It is vital that judicial independence is protected in order to uphold the rule of law and enhance 
public confidence in the judicial system. Historically, judicial independence has been crucial 
to ensuring disputes are resolved using “logical, analytical methods”.125 Judges must determine 
the outcome of the case by applying the relevant law. Any external interference with their 
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judgment can lessen the quality of judicial outcomes. When judicial independence is protected, 
public confidence in the judiciary is upheld.126 
Judicial independence is a critical aspect of New Zealand’s legal system. Other jurisdictions, 
such as the United States and Switzerland, have judiciaries which are not politically neutral.127 
This has the potential to generate court decisions that are politically motivated and erodes the 
ability of the judiciary to effectively oversee the legislature and adjudicate fairly on rights 
issues. The concept of judicial independence would be undermined in New Zealand if judges 
were required to consider public opinion, because then an external source could unduly guide 
their decision-making. JA Jolowicz wrote that there are many different definitions and 
conceptions of judicial independence. However, several key aspects are present in every 
definition. One of these is that “[a judge] must also be free of interference or influence outside 
the proceedings from the parties or others”.128 Therefore, in order to uphold the principle of 
judicial independence, judges should not consider public opinion. 
Judicial independence also requires that a judge be free from any conflict of interest, 
particularly one that shows bias in regards “to differences arising from culture, race, religious 
beliefs, or gender”.129 If judges consider public opinion, then they also need to consider the 
general public bias that exists towards these groups. Therefore, consideration of public opinion 
is incompatible with judicial independence in this aspect as well. In addition, judicial guidelines 
state that judges should not publicly express any political views.130 If judges considered public 
opinion, they would be forced to consider the political views held by members of the public. 
This would unduly guide their reasoning and be inconsistent with Shimon Shetreet’s argument 
that judicial independence requires total neutrality.131 
1 Consideration of public opinion can provide a check on judicial power 
The primary counter-argument to this is that judicial independence is not of paramount 
importance. Instead, judges’ power should be controlled and they should be held accountable 
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for the decisions that are made. Consideration of public opinion can provide an important check 
on judicial power. If judges have the ability to essentially make laws, then there should be some 
controls in place to limit this power. There are several reasons for this. First, judges may not 
make decisions which are beneficial for all New Zealanders. It is an assumption to say that a 
powerful judiciary always rules in favour of protecting minority rights when given the 
opportunity. Not all judges may be objective and impartial in practice. If they have their own 
political motivations they may aggressively rule against popular public opinion (even if public 
opinion is in favour of expanding human rights legislation). To demonstrate this point, there 
are several cases where the United States Supreme Court failed to uphold basic human rights. 
Notable examples include: Scott v Sandford, which held that a black person could not be a 
citizen of the United States,132 and Plessy v Ferguson, which upheld the constitutionality of 
segregation laws.133 Therefore, it is difficult to say that judges always uphold human rights in 
the face of contrary public opinion. There need to be checks on the power of the judiciary, just 
like there are electoral checks on Parliament. 
It is arguable that the principle of judicial independence is not as important as it is often made 
out to be. Judicial independence cannot be prioritised over judicial accountability. The 
judiciary must be held publicly accountable for the decisions that are made.134 This is especially 
so when a judicial decision amounts to effectively making a new law. Therefore, there is 
tension between accountability and independence.135 These principles need to be balanced 
rather than overly emphasising independence. 
Shimon Shetreet argues that judicial accountability is important and must be finely balanced 
with judicial independence, because the public expects the judiciary to be held accountable for 
“failures, errors, or misconduct”.136 Without judicial accountability, public confidence in the 
judiciary can be compromised, because the public expects the judiciary to be answerable to 
society.137 Riddell JA of the Court of Appeal for Ontario wrote that “judges are the servants, 
not the masters of the people”.138 Therefore, it is arguable that judges should have to consider 
public opinion and reflect the views of the people. The judiciary is a public institution and as 
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such, cannot make decisions in a vacuum without regard to the commonly held views of the 
people. By making public opinion a mandatory factor for judges to consider, judicial 
accountability is protected. Judges are responsible to the public and their decisions should 
reflect the wishes of the public. 
C Public Opinion Has No Authority in Judicial Law-Making 
A final important reason to disregard public opinion is that it actually holds no legal weight. 
When making decisions, judges should be guided by relevant sources such as legislation, case 
law, and appropriate external sources (such as expert evidence).139 It is arguable that public 
opinion cannot be classed as an appropriate external source. Ben Keith argues that use of 
external material could potentially give some sort of “inherent legal authority to that 
material”.140 Roger Alford describes use of external material as a way of outsourcing authority 
from legislation and case law.141 Therefore, public opinion is simply irrelevant when judges 
are deciding the outcome of a case. It introduces “a utilitarian analysis that runs counter to [the] 
legal basis” of judicial decision-making.142 In addition, deference to public opinion has the 
potential to impede the court’s ability to consider other relevant factors such as international 
legal obligations and the Treaty of Waitangi.143 This is because adding more factors for judges 
to consider inevitably means less weight must be given to each new competing factor. 
A particular problem with judicial focus on public opinion is that this focus could come at the 
expense of considering expert opinion. This is particularly problematic given the fact that 
sometimes public opinion is in direct opposition to expert evidence.144 A prime example of this 
issue arose in the case of Seales v Attorney-General. In that case, the plaintiff (Ms Seales) was 
joined by three additional parties: the Human Rights Commission, Care Alliance, and the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society of New Zealand. These three parties gave expert evidence about 
the inconsistency of the current law with both the Bill of Rights Act and human rights 
generally.145 Therefore, there was expert evidence in favour of the plaintiff’s argument. 
However, the judiciary decided it could not act and any change had to be left to Parliament.146 
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Following the decision, a petition was presented to Parliament asking them to “investigate fully 
public attitudes towards the introduction of legislation which would permit medically-assisted 
dying in the event of a terminal illness or an irreversible condition which makes life 
unbearable”.147 Following this, an inquiry is to be carried out by the Health Select Committee 
who may or may not recommend legislative change. This is problematic, because now the 
general public opinion has a great amount of weight in determining an issue that arguably 
should be left to the relevant experts. 
Another example of this issue in the New Zealand context is the increasing focus on punitive 
measures in sentencing. Successive governments, driven by popular public opinion, have 
adopted a “tough on crime” rhetoric when legislating judicial guidelines for judges.148 Lobby 
groups, such as the Sensible Sentencing Trust, have added to the general public hysteria.149 
However, there is a body of criminological research which suggests a punitive approach is 
ineffective at reducing rates of recidivism and reintegrating offenders back into society.150 
Despite this research, a harsh approach has been favoured in recent legislation, and has been 
applied by the judiciary.151 Sharon Casey and Phillip Mohr argue that a reliance on public 
opinion could cause problems with informed discussion as members of the public can be 
uninformed and very emotive.152 People do not always reason in a rational way, and many do 
not consider long-term implications.153 
In addition, it is arguable that many members of the New Zealand public are uninformed 
because they are generally apathetic to any important changes. In Taylor v Attorney-General, 
the High Court issued the first judicial declaration of inconsistency, declaring that the Electoral 
(Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 (which disenfranchised 
prisoners) was an unjustified limitation on the right to vote contained in section 12 of the Bill 
of Rights Act.154 However, the decision generated relatively little publicity and the government 
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has yet to formally respond.155 Andrew Geddis noted that “because New Zealand has an 
unwritten, largely informal constitution, it can change in quite major ways without generating 
much fanfare”.156 This case shows that New Zealanders can be largely disinterested and 
uninformed when it comes to constitutional developments, which supports the proposition that 
courts should rely on important empirical evidence as opposed to public opinion. These 
examples show that in some cases, when the judiciary makes decisions based on public opinion 
they can achieve less effective outcomes. 
The benefits of relying on empirical evidence and largely ignoring public opinion are perhaps 
best exemplified by the United States case of Brown v Board of Education. In this case, the 
Supreme Court ruled that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional.157 Part of the basis 
for this decision was expert evidence given that racial segregation caused psychological harm 
to black children.158 Philippa Strum noted the advantages of using an approach based on 
empirical evidence, saying lawyers should focus on explaining the “facts that make a law 
reasonable”.159 By avoiding consideration of potentially ill-informed and emotive public 
opinion, the court can make more logical decisions. 
A further reason to not consider public opinion is that judges may have trouble actually 
determining the predominant public view. Without recourse to reliable and secure public voting 
on an issue, judges will inevitably struggle to determine the general public opinion at any given 
time. Judges would have to resort to crude mechanisms like opinion polling in order to 
determine what the majority of the public wanted. Sharon Casey and Phillip Mohr argue that 
data relating to public opinion is “subject to both random and systematic errors”.160 Polls can 
focus on skewered sample groups and sampling is inherently unreliable.161 In the interests of 
accuracy and efficiency, judges should disregard the consideration of public opinion entirely. 
However, there is a counter argument that judges could instead invite interested groups to make 
submissions, similarly to the way the Select Committee asks for public submissions.162 This 
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could ameliorate the problem of using potentially inaccurate polling data, but it would still 
result in only a small portion of people being heard by the judiciary. 
This raises the issue of consistency. If courts were to take public opinion into account, it would 
be difficult to determine how consistently this could be done in practice. The judiciary may 
choose to see public opinion as a relevant factor, but this leaves open the issue of how much 
weight this factor should have. Various judges could ascribe different weight to public opinion. 
Some may see it as paramount while others could be more prepared to derogate from the 
popular public viewpoint. Public opinion that is overwhelmingly in favour of one position 
(such as the outcry that lead to the enactment of the Foreshore and Seabed Act) may be seen 
as a more substantial factor than public opinion that is more closely in favour of one position 
(such as the vote that lead to the retention of the mixed member proportional representation 
system).163 Conversely, it may not be regarded as a more important factor. It is arguable that 
there are too many variables and the introduction of public opinion as a relevant factor could 
produce inconsistent outcomes, which would erode public confidence in the judiciary.164 
However, it is also arguable that the development of comprehensive judicial guidelines could 
ameliorate this issue and achieve more consistent results. 
1 Judges must justify their decisions with regard to all relevant factors 
There is an important counter-argument to the proposition that public opinion is irrelevant. 
Judges must justify their decisions with regard to all significant factors, and this should include 
public opinion. It is important that judges provide logical and comprehensive justifications for 
the decisions they make. John Bell writes that judges often refer to vague concepts such as 
“common sense” and that judges must validate their decisions in a more appropriate way, 
particularly when the decision in question affects future policy.165 John Burrows argues that 
the judiciary needs to understand the broader implications of their decisions,166 and apply these 
when writing their final judgments. Even members of the judiciary have themselves supported 
this idea. Sir Ivor Richardson argued that:167 
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[T]he court should be furnished with arguments and available analytical material so that 
proposed policy alternatives are considered in an informed way rather than resting on 
instinctive responses supported by generalised reasons. 
It follows from this that the judiciary should consider all available material, in order to make a 
justified decision. Part of this material must be popular public opinion. Judges should consider 
how the majority of ordinary New Zealanders feel about the changes they want to make, 
especially if these changes have wide-ranging effects. This is consistent with the democratic 
nature of our legal system. 
In addition, if the judiciary properly justifies the decisions that are made and refers to popular 
public opinion, this should increase public confidence in the judiciary. It is extremely important 
that the public has confidence in the ability of the judiciary to make the correct decisions. 
Justice must be done and must be seen to be done.168 However, there is a counter-argument 
here that because the judiciary is losing some of its independence, this will also have the effect 
of reducing public confidence. There is a tension between considering all available material 
and being fully independent. These values must be balanced. 
These counter-arguments raise valid points. However, I argue that these points cannot generally 
trump the importance of protecting minority rights and upholding judicial independence. It is 
important that judges are free from any irrelevant pressures.169 This ensures they make 
decisions that are consistent with human rights. However, in the specific situation that judges 
are effectively creating new law, public opinion should be one of many factors to be considered. 
Public opinion should not be determinative nor should it be conclusive. However, the views of 
ordinary New Zealanders should at least be a relevant factor in judicial law-making. 
IV Recommendation 
Given the competing arguments, it is difficult to determine the most appropriate way for judges 
to reduce the democratic deficit when effectively making new law. On one hand, considering 
public opinion is consistent with democratic values. On the other hand, considering public 
opinion can lead to outcomes which conflict with important human rights. I argue that the 
correct approach is for judges to consider public opinion in certain cases, but even in those 
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cases, it should only be one of many factors to be taken into account. The use of public opinion 
should be restricted in order to preserve judicial independence and ensure other relevant 
considerations are given due weight. In addition, it is vital that judges limit use of majoritarian 
public opinion so they can protect minority rights. In this way, the role of the judiciary can 
complement the role of the legislature. Legislators can focus on reflecting the views of the 
majority while judges focus on protecting minority groups from the “tyranny of the 
majority”.170 Largely ignoring public opinion avoids the problem of over-politicising the 
judiciary. Judicial agents are free to consider issues that Parliament has failed to take into 
account, such as human rights legislation, international legal obligations, and the Treaty of 
Waitangi.171 
Given this starting point, it must be determined in which situations courts should have some 
reference to public opinion. Public opinion should only be relevant where the decision has 
broader societal implications. In other words, it should only be considered where judges are (1) 
effectively creating a new law and (2) this new law will affect a substantial part of society. In 
cases concerning either private disputes between individuals or disputes that could have 
broader legal implications but only for minority groups, public opinion should remain 
irrelevant. 
This means there are three categories of cases, and public opinion should only be relevant in 
one. To demonstrate this point, three examples are discussed. First, there is a situation where 
the dispute is essentially private in nature and does not have any broader ramifications. An 
example of this is criminal sentencing. In sentencing cases, the court should not consider public 
opinion. Judges should determine which outcome is best for the parties involved (with 
reference to the guidelines in the Sentencing Act 2002).172 This is important because public 
opinion can be inconsistent with specialist evidence about how best to achieve sentencing 
aims.173 Second, there is a situation where a court decision could amount to making new law, 
but this law affects only a small portion of society, so judges should focus on upholding 
minority rights as opposed to reflecting public opinion. In Taylor v Attorney-General, the court 
was asked to consider whether disenfranchising prisoners was inconsistent with human rights 
legislation. They held that the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment 
Act amounted to an unjustified limitation on the right to vote contained in section 12 of the Bill 
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of Rights Act. In this case, the court was right not to defer to public opinion, because the 
decision would only affect the rights of a minority group. The rights of any non-prisoners were 
not at issue. Therefore, their views should not be considered. 
Conversely, there are some cases where public opinion should be a judicial concern, because 
the judiciary is essentially making a law that affects the general population. For example, in JT 
International SA v Commonwealth of Australia, the High Court of Australia held that plain 
packaging regulations for tobacco products did not constitute “acquisition of property” and as 
such, these regulations were legal.174 Tobacco companies are now required to use plain 
packaging when selling their products in Australia.175 The decision made no reference to public 
opinion (which presumably had driven the original legislative change). However, the court 
agreed with both the legislature and the prevailing public opinion. Studies have shown that the 
majority of people support new measures to control the availability and use of tobacco 
products.176 It is important that the courts have some regard to public opinion in similar cases, 
because their decision has broader legal implications for a large portion of society. In this case, 
there were serious restrictions placed on the use of intellectual property for tobacco 
companies.177 
The final issue to resolve here is how to determine whether a decision will have broader 
ramifications for a substantial part of society. It could be hard for the court to categorise cases 
in the way discussed on a consistent basis. I propose that if the legislature were to allow reform 
and give the judiciary more power, then they should also develop a comprehensive set of 
judicial guidelines. These guidelines will assist judges in this categorisation exercise. The 
guidelines should be based on the provisions of the Supreme Court Act 2003 which relate to 
criteria for leave to appeal. The Act states that one of the reasons “for the Supreme Court to 
hear and determine a proposed appeal [is] if … the appeal involves a matter of general or public 
importance”.178 Once the test “a matter of general or public importance” is met, the court should 
consider public opinion as a relevant factor. 
In practice, the court itself would have to decide whether this test is met, just as the Supreme 
Court determines whether an appellant’s claim falls within the scope of section 13 of the 
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Supreme Court Act.179 The judiciary should have regard to the body of case law on whether an 
appeal is “a matter of general or public importance” to determine whether a case requires 
consideration of public opinion. However, many cases are confined to their particular facts, 
which makes it difficult for the courts to develop a logical and comprehensive test. For 
example, the court in Zaoui v Attorney-General held that the issue of whether the defendant 
should be granted bail was sufficiently important to grant leave.180 The case was very fact-
specific and is arguably unlikely to come before the Supreme Court again. It is important that 
guidelines are in place in order for the judiciary to make consistent decisions. However, given 
the fact-specific nature of judicial decision-making (and consequently judicial law-making), it 
might be best to set the broad guideline that a case must concern “a matter of general or public 
importance” and allow judges the discretion to apply that test to each individual case. For this 
approach to work, it is imperative that judges give comprehensive reasons for why a case does 
or does not meet this test. 
The authors of McGechan on Procedure set out a concise summary of the case law in this area. 
They agree that the phrase “a matter of general or public importance” will “obviously depend 
on the circumstances, and it is not possible to provide a concise definition of when those criteria 
will be met”.181 However, the text also provides a list of the important cases where the criteria 
has been satisfied:182 
(1) Where the issue is whether “barristerial immunity” should continue to apply.183 
(2) Where the issue is whether a person can act as an employee or independent contractor under 
the Employment Relations Act 2000.184 
(3) Where the case concerns important questions of electoral law, such as the proportionality 
of Parliament.185 
(4) Where the case involves the determination of the meaning of s 44C Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976.186 
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The authors of McGechan on Procedure also provide a list of cases where the criteria has not 
been met.187 Their analysis shows that even though the term “a matter of general or public 
importance” is somewhat vague, a body of case law can develop in this area which allows 
judges to determine whether the test is met in later cases. 
Though this seems like a useful starting point, using these decisions for guidance is also 
problematic, because the court often fails to give reasons for allowing or denying leave.188 
Guidance has to be found from individual cases in a specific context. For example, in 
Bahramitash v Kumar, Blanchard J asserted that if a case related to an important clause in a 
standard form contract, then the case would contain “a matter of general or public 
importance”.189 This pronouncement is useful for any case relating to a standard form contract, 
because it is clear when these cases will fall within the ambit of the test. 
It is important to note that there is a problem with simply importing the case law regarding 
section 13 of the Supreme Court Act, as many of the decisions concerning leave have been 
decided on factual grounds. Andrew Beck writes that when deciding whether to grant leave 
“[the Supreme Court] has focused narrowly on the factual issues of individual cases, declining 
to engage on broader questions of law”.190 Andrew Beck goes on to assert that because of this, 
the Supreme Court seemed quite restrictive in refusing leave in three notable cases: Calan 
Healthcare Properties Ltd v Ord,191 Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,192 and 
Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General.193 Part of the reason for this must be the 
Supreme Court’s desire to preserve limited judicial resources. This is a concern that would not 
apply to a judicial test about whether public opinion is relevant. Because of this, the tests from 
case law in this area need to be regarded with caution. Only decisions that focus on whether 
the case raises an important question of law should be used. Decisions on whether to grant 
leave to the Supreme Court are a useful starting point, but the judiciary needs to take time to 
develop their own case law regarding whether public opinion is a relevant factor. 
The proposed outcome is the best option because it adequately balances the interests of both 
majority groups and minority groups in society. To ameliorate the problem of democratic 
deficit in judicial law-making, judges should consider public opinion. However, their 
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consideration of public opinion should be limited to cases where the outcome has a wide-
ranging legal effect for the general public. This outcome ensures the judiciary can focus on 
their primary objective: the objective and logical resolution of human rights cases. It is arguable 
that this approach would not be effective, because it relies on judges exercising their own 
discretion to (1) determine whether public opinion should be a relevant factor and (2) actually 
take public opinion into account in a meaningful way. However, I argue that because judges in 
New Zealand have been consistently cautious and prudent in their approach to law-making,194 
they will use this attentiveness in any reformed system. Judges can be trusted to consider public 
opinion, rather than be constrained by it. 
V Conclusion 
Sir Kenneth Keith wrote in the introduction to the Cabinet Manual that “a balance has to be 
struck between majority power and minority right” and that it is vital to consider the importance 
of both “the sovereignty of the people exercised through Parliament and the rule of the law”.195 
In this paper, I have argued that the fundamental principles espoused by Sir Kenneth Keith are 
important in modern New Zealand. Democratic legitimacy and positive human rights 
adjudication are equally vital to a functioning society and it is important that the legal system 
gives equal weight to both. 
This paper first outlined the main problem with our current constitutional arrangements: too 
much weight is given to democratic legitimacy at the expense of positive human rights 
adjudication. Based on this, it is arguable that the judiciary should have more power to 
intervene in law-making. Four hypothetical options of judicial intervention were presented. 
Regardless of which option should be ultimately adopted, a system of increased judicial 
intervention could leave a democratic deficit. 
The main part of the paper considered how to ameliorate this deficit. We could expand the role 
of public opinion in judicial law-making. This could correct the democratic deficit in judicial 
law-making, but it also has several inherent problems. I argued that there are three key reasons 
why judges should continue to disregard public opinion, even if they are essentially creating 
new law: (a) the judiciary can continue to protect minority rights in the face of adverse public 
opinion, (b) refusal to consider public opinion ensures the judiciary remains apolitical so 
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judicial independence is upheld, and (c) public opinion has no legal weight and judges may 
have difficulty ascertaining public opinion. Despite these arguments, it was ultimately 
conceded that there are some important counter-arguments to these points. Judges cannot make 
law without regard to the context of the society they are in. It is concluded that under a reformed 
system, the courts should generally continue to decline to consider public opinion, as this would 
preserve their impartiality and independence. However, public opinion should play a role in 
some limited situations. Public opinion should only be relevant where a court decision could 
have broad implications for a substantial part of society, and even then, it would only be one 
of many factors for the courts to consider. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon wrote that “democracy does not mean simple majority rule; an 
objective and unbiased assessment of minority interests must also be attempted”.196 In this 
paper, I have asserted that a system of pure legislative supremacy could focus too heavily on 
simple majority rule. There is potential for the judiciary to intervene to protect minority 
interests. However, judicial intervention lacks democratic legitimacy and it may be necessary 
for the courts to correct this deficit by taking public opinion into account. To preserve their 
traditional role as a protector of human rights and a safeguard against the supreme power of 
Parliament, the judiciary should only do this in a limited way. 
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